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1. Introduction
1 
Most papers in this conference place Italy in an international context by looking at how 
the country fared relatively to the rest of the world in a number of areas. The present one takes 
an even more openly comparative approach by directly contrasting Italy’s overall 
macroeconomic experience since World War II with that of Germany
2 and Japan (for the sake 
of brevity, the three countries are often called IGJ in what follows). The most obvious reason for 
this choice is the course of economic history since 1945. The three countries were defeated in 
war, enjoyed rapid growth in the reconstruction period, experienced “economic miracles” in the 
so-called Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s, were faced by sharp decelerations in the two 
decades that followed the first oil shock, and have recorded the slowest growth rates seen in the 
OECD area since the mid-1990s. Other countries have, of course, shared some of these trends; 
none, probably, have had quite so similar developments through time. Confirmation of this is 
provided by Table 1 which shows, for per capita GDP, an IGJ performance that is well above 
that of comparable economies in the first two periods and well below in the last one.
3 
There are, of course, many other similarities, as well as glaring differences in the 
economic structures and histories of IGJ. Among the former, one could list high household 
savings, a bank-centred financial system, ownership set-ups that, however much they may differ 
from each other, differ even more markedly from the Anglo-American paradigm (Carlin 1996; 
Barca  et al. 2001), etc. Among the latter are very different inflation histories, trade union 
behaviour, patterns (and speeds) of integration into the world economy, importance of regional 
problems, etc. In what follows an attempt will be made to look at many of these issues, 
primarily from an Italian standpoint, with Germany and Japan being used as illustrations of how 
differently, or similarly, structures evolved or policies reacted to exogenous events. It should be 
noted that the approach is largely descriptive and many of the conclusions are based on 
subjective judgments. 
The Paper is organized along (boring) chronological lines. Section 1 looks at the 
reconstruction years (1945-53); Section 2 at the Golden Age (1953-73), Section 3 at the post-oil 
shock period (1973-95); Section 4 at the more recent years of semi-stagnation (1995-2011); 
Section 5 then examines the specific issue of within country regional differentials while the 
Conclusions, predictably perhaps, try to (briefly) conclude. 
2. Reconstruction 
In Italy, but also in Germany and Japan, reconstruction turned out to be a much smoother 
process than had initially been feared given the post-World War I experience of a brief boom 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Wendy Carlin and Marcello De Cecco for helpful comments. 
2 Germany stands for West Germany until 1991 and for the whole country thereafter. 
3 As with any periodization, issue could be taken with the particular time spans here shown. While any choice of 
terminal years is, inevitably, somewhat arbitrary, it is felt that for present purposes it reflects a not unreasonable 
compromise given the histories of the three countries here considered. 
 
5soon reversed by recession, inflation and, even, hyperinflation (Armstrong et al. 1991). The 
amount of war-time destruction had, of course, been more limited in Italy than in the other two 
countries (ibid.). Hence Italy returned to the pre-war levels of output already by the late 
1940s/early 1950s, somewhat earlier than the mid-1950s of Germany or Japan, but in all the 
three countries recovery was remarkably speedy. 
Some of the reasons for why reconstruction turned out to be so much more successful than 
after World War I are common to all the major belligerent OECD countries. They have to do, 
inter alia, with a different domestic policy stance in Western Europe and with a different 
external policy stance in the United States (Boltho 2001a). Turning more specifically to IGJ, a 
number of similarities and, more importantly, differences, are worth noting. One striking 
similarity was the inflation and subsequent price stabilization experience. Inflation was rampant 
initially, but was then curbed by a sharp monetary squeeze in Italy in 1947, by a major currency 
reform in Germany in 1948, and by a very restrictive fiscal stabilization plan in Japan in 1949. 
And in all three countries, but especially in Germany and Japan, the demand shortages arising 
from these policies were greatly relieved by the outbreak of the Korean War and the economic 
boom that ensued.  
A more important similarity was the early solution given to the uncertainties about the 
post-war institutional set-up. Such uncertainty was widespread in the late 1940s, given strong 
worker militancy everywhere (Armstrong et al. 1991) and the threat, particularly felt in Europe, 
of encroaching Soviet power. While a shift to a centrally planned economy was not really on the 
cards, countries such as Britain or France were engaging at the time in large scale 
nationalizations and indicative planning. The presence of US troops in IGJ made such policy 
shifts much less likely, but, initially (and in Italy and Germany at least until the 1948 elections 
and currency reform respectively), the business world felt unsure about its future role. In the end 
an open and liberal market system was chosen in all three countries, but there was no certainty 
of this at the outset. 
One much discussed longer-run consequence of the reconstruction period has been the 
destruction wrought on what have been called “distributional coalitions”, particularly in 
Germany and in Japan (Olson 1982). Subsequent growth, it has been argued, was greatly helped 
by the purge of pre-war elites and by the destruction of cartels, lobbies and other pressure 
groups whose rent-seeking activities sap the vitality of an economy. Yet this factor does not 
seem to have been important. A recent survey of the evidence, for instance, showed that there is 
little support for the Olsonian hypothesis in Germany or Japan (Heckeleman 2007); similar 
studies of Italy are not available, probably because “Mancur Olson did not attract much interest” 
in the country (Da Empoli 1993, p. 81). 
In other words: “Although the war may have disturbed the earlier constellation of 
institutional arrangements and interest groups, it did not prevent them from being rapidly 
reconstituted” (Eichengreen 2007, p. 54). Thus, in Germany, the main distributional coalitions 
“re-emerged […] with ideas, ideologies, practical purposes and personnel that were in full 
continuity with Weimar times” (Paqué 1996, p. 97). In Italy too, there is little evidence of a 
breakdown of pre-war structures. Indeed, one of the main economic achievements of Fascist 
6Italy, the creation during the Great Depression of the large state-holding company IRI, was 
preserved (despite initial US resistance) with virtually the same management (Barca and Trento 
1997). It was probably only in Japan that some changes turned out to be growth-promoting: 
zaibatsu dissolution raised intra-industry competition and allowed junior managers to achieve 
power much earlier than would otherwise have been possible (Kosai 1986); land reform 
stimulated agriculture; labour reform raised incomes and encouraged demand growth 
(Nakamura 1981). But all these changes resulted from US reforms, not from a breakdown of the 
pre-war system.
4 
Even if an Olsonian bonfire of distributional coalitions did not occur, the reconstruction 
period provided a window of opportunity for the adoption of radical changes in the three 
countries’ institutional set-ups. The opportunity was not fully seized, but, arguably, more was 
done in Germany and Japan than in Italy, in part because of US behaviour. Thus, Germany and, 
especially, Japan, were tightly supervised by the occupation authorities, while Italy was left 
broadly in charge of its reconstruction process. This, in turn, influenced the nature of the 
reforms that took place. In Italy, an old liberal tradition managed to reassert itself. The controls 
of the Fascist economy were dismantled relatively quickly (by the standards of what was 
happening elsewhere in Europe) and a return to free trade, in particular, was rapidly achieved 
(Graziani 1972). Reforms in Germany and Japan, if in different ways, went beyond this. Thus, 
both countries saw some purging of top management and a policy of cartel busting, with Japan, 
in addition (and as already mentioned), eliminating the pre-war family control of major 
corporations through zaibatsu dissolution. None of this occurred in Italy (Barca et al. 2001).  
Germany, just as Italy, also saw a return to a long-standing liberal tradition which 
contributed to monetary reform and rapid decontrol. Interestingly, however, Germany’s liberal 
instincts were tempered by the search for a “third way” (Abelshauser 2004) which, already at 
the time, began laying the ground for what became known as the Soziale Marktwirtschaft. No 
doubt encouraged by the US occupation authorities who were strongly influence by the New 
Deal experience, some of the participants in the German discussion at the time advocated 
“liberal interventionism” and a “strong state” (ivi, p. 95), so as to moderate the social costs of 
unfettered markets.
5 The outcome was a gradual adoption of measures, such as welfare 
provisions and co-determination, that may well have helped in fostering social consensus. 
Nothing of the sort happened in Italy. On the contrary, a polarization between a conservative 
business class and an antagonistic, left-wing trade union movement (polarization that in milder 
                                                 
4 A further important legacy was, of course, the American imposed Constitution under which Japan renounced war 
and curtailed its military spending. Avoidance of that burden may well also have contributed to the country’s 
subsequent growth (Kosai 1986), more so probably than was the case in Germany or Italy which also sheltered 
under the US security umbrella. Over the 20 years to 1973, defence expenditure amounted to just over 1 per cent of 
GDP in Japan, as against figures of 2.7 and 3.4 per cent in Italy and Germany respectively. 
5 Actual implementation of these ideas took time, of course. The 1949 Constitution vaguely referred to the 
principle, legislation on social housing came in 1950, on co-determination in 1951-52 (even if co-determination 
was practiced in parts of the coal and steel industries already in 1947) (von Prollius 2006), but a significant reform 
of the pension system had to wait until 1957. Still, even this came well before similar measures in either Italy or 
Japan. 
7form had already existed before World War I) became entrenched in these years (Magnani 
1997). 
Japan’s pre-war liberal tradition had been much weaker than those of Italy or Germany. 
Hence, there was little demand in the country for a quick removal of controls and “the system 
that emerged after reform was by no means a truly market-based system; instead it was 
characterized by a substantial degree of government intervention” (Teranishi and Kosai 1993, p. 
15), especially in areas such as foreign trade and financial markets. This would leave a legacy 
for later years. A further important legacy came from land reform. This not only contributed to 
subsequent agricultural growth, but also led to much greater income and wealth equality (Kosai 
1986), an outcome that may have helped later economic success. Italy’s efforts in this area were 
much more timid and less successful.
6  
The reconstruction period, in other words, may have opened an institutional gap between 
Italy on the one hand and Germany and Japan on the other. The latter two countries, whether of 
their own volition, or under American pressure, adopted some fairly radical reforms which, if in 
different forms, almost certainly paved the way for a subsequent degree of social consensus that 
was much greater than what had existed before the war. Italy’s reforms were less far-reaching 
and the country reverted to the non-consensual pre-fascist liberal order. Had Italian reformers 
been more audacious, or had the US been more influential or assertive, the course of subsequent 
economic developments in the country might well have been different and, arguably, welfare 
enhancing. 
3.  The Golden Age 
The contours of the period that goes from the end of reconstruction to the first oil shock 
are well-known and broadly similar in all the three countries. Growth was exceptionally rapid 
and also very smooth, despite a US-induced slowdown in 1958 and brief, home-grown, 
recessions in 1964-65 (Italy), 1965 (Japan) and 1967 (Germany). The period also recorded rapid 
employment growth (indeed, Germany and Japan enjoyed virtual full employment most of the 
time), witnessed sharp rises (if at different speeds) in export market shares and saw the 
extension to the whole population of welfare state provisions (if of different generosity). Not for 
nothing, the experiences of IGJ in these years were often referred to as “economic miracles”
7 
even if (blot on the picture) there was also a move from near price stability at the outset to high 
inflation by the early 1970s. 
All three countries faced, of course, a world economy which itself grew at unprecedented 
rates. In addition, international trade was liberalized (with Italy and Germany also joining a 
                                                 
6 Rough estimates suggest that Italy’s land reform in the early 1950s transferred between 6 and 10 per cent of total 
acreage from large landowners to small farmers, of which less than half was expropriated (Graziani 1972; Ciocca 
2007). In Japan, by contrast, close to 40 per cent of total acreage was, de facto, confiscated in the late 1940s and 
transferred to the erstwhile tenants (Kawagoe 1993). 
7 The words “miracolo economico” and “Wirtschaftswunder” appear almost automatically when the period is 
mentioned in the Italian and German literature. The Japanese are less given to hyperbolae and refer to these years 
under the more neutral words of “kōdō seichō jidai” or era of high economic growth. 
8preferential trade area), and the terms of trade moved in their favour. Between 1953 and 1972 
(rather than 1973, when import prices soared because of the first oil shock), the ratio of export 
to import prices rose by as much as 2 and 1½ per cent per annum in Japan and Germany 
respectively (Italy saw a more modest 0.3 per cent annual improvement). 
Demand management was little used by IGJ through most of the period (indeed, in Japan, 
cycles may well have been policy generated) (Ackley and Ishi 1976). Yet, fiscal and monetary 
policies may still have helped capital formation by coordinating their stance in a growth-
promoting way. In all three countries, fiscal policy was orthodox, while monetary policy was 
broadly accommodating. Budgets were, through most of the period, kept in broad balance or 
even small surplus (thereby adding to the supply of savings). Italy was a partial exception, but 
even here budget deficits were contained through most of the period to levels well below those 
of earlier or later eras. Money supply, on the other hand, was allowed to grow rapidly (thus 
facilitating investment), without this leading to inflation in view of the concomitant growth of 
demand for money in buoyant economies (Table 2). Even that paragon of anti-inflationary 
credibility, the Bundesbank, allowed broad money supply growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s 
of as much as 14 per cent per annum, as did Italy (while consumer price inflation remained 
negligible). 
Behind these various factors, lies, of course, a further force common to all the three 
countries: catch-up. High growth and investment were fostered by a backlog of opportunities 
vis-à-vis the US and by the high profits made possible by elastic labour supplies (Kindleberger 
1967). Though full employment was eventually achieved in the urban sector of the three 
economies, a reserve army of under-employed labour was still present until the very end of the 
period in the Italian and Japanese countryside, or in Southern Europe for Germany. And the 
rapid productivity growth which buoyant investment generated, together with the low wage 
settlements which elastic labour supplies permitted, was a further ingredient in the virtuous 
circle of high investment and high export growth. In fact, catch-up provides a compelling 
explanation for the Golden Age story both for IGJ and for the rest of the OECD area. Figure 1 
shows how even an extremely simple specification of the convergence hypothesis throws a good 
deal of light on the 1953-73 differential growth experience. Indeed, it will be seen that both 
Italian and German growth can be almost fully “explained” by their relative backwardness at the 
outset. It is only Japan (together with Ireland) which stands out as a partial exception. 
Backwardness provided the opportunity. Social capability then exploited it (Abramovitz 
1986). And social capability may have differed. Defining, let alone measuring, the concept is, of 
course, impossible. What can be done is to look at selected socio-economic aspects of a country 
which can, plausibly, be thought of as important in facilitating the exploitation of a catch-up 
potential. Three will be looked at in this context: educational achievements, the presence of 
cooperative institutions, and the pressure of competitive forces. Educational achievement is 
easiest to quantify. Table 3 presents estimates of the educational attainment of the total and of 
the adult populations. Both at the outset and through the period it is Germany and, especially, 
9Japan that stand out. This factor might well have facilitated, inter alia, the exploitation of 
foreign technologies.
8 
Turning to the possibility of institutions fostering cooperative behaviour which, in turn, 
could enhance growth, two, not mutually exclusive, approaches are worth noting: i) the idea that 
trade union structures are important in directly determining inflation/ unemployment outcomes 
and in indirectly influencing macroeconomic ones (Calmfors and Driffill 1988), and ii) the 
alternative view that it was particular institutions and policies encouraging cooperative 
solutions, present in some, but not in all, West European countries, which greatly helped in 
securing moderate wage settlements and high investment rates (Eichengreen 2007). 
Calmfors and Driffill suggest that highly centralized, all-encompassing national unions, or 
highly decentralized, enterprise unions, are preferable to intermediate, or sectoral/industrial 
unions, and place Germany and Japan in the first and second category respectively, while 
relegating Italy to the third. Further refinements have, for instance, argued that Japan is, in fact, 
a country in which centralized co-ordination between unions and employers federations 
dominates (Soskice 1990), but the ultimate conclusion has seldom been put in doubt. The 
evolution of unionism, largely dictated by history, could thus be one explanation for the two 
countries’ better performance relative to Italy’s. 
Eichengreen’s view is that implicit work force-enterprise bargains secured faster growth in 
some European countries than in others. Germany fits this hypothesis better than Italy. Germany 
had institutions and policies, some going back to Weimar days, others developed early in the 
period (e.g. co-determination) that could plausibly be seen as having encouraged cooperation. 
Similar institutions and policies, on the other hand, are hardly mentioned by Eichengreen in the 
case of Italy and it is, indeed, difficult to see much evidence for them. Japan is not covered by 
Eichengreen, but there is sufficient circumstantial evidence suggesting that the country’s labour 
force was ready to forego immediate wage claims in exchange for higher investments and, 
therefore, higher real incomes, in the future. After all, the practice of “life-time employment”, 
even if only applied in large-scale firms, and the large share of compensation accruing in the 
form of bonuses, would both have worked in favour of longer-term commitments.
9 All of the 
preceding suggests that for complex historical and institutional reasons, Germany and, 
especially, Japan were in a more favourable position than was Italy in exploiting relative 
backwardness with less social strife and conflict. 
A not dissimilar conclusion may be drawn from an alternative viewpoint that stresses not 
so much cooperation as the forces unleashed by competition. IGJ all moved away from the 
controlled pre-war economies, but did so at different speed. Of the three, Germany embraced 
                                                 
8 The data shown in the table cover only the formal educational system. This, almost certainly, understates the 
achievements of Germany and Japan. In the former country, a large share of the young obtain apprenticeship 
qualifications after leaving school; in the latter the same result is achieved by widespread provisions of on-the-job 
training. 
9 Few, in any case, would doubt that Japan possessed at least some of the characteristics of “co-ordinated 
capitalism” that Eichengreen (1997, p. 3) considers crucial: “solidaristic trade unions, cohesive employers 
associations, and growth-minded governments”. 
10competitive forces most vigorously. It opened itself fully to the rest of the world, going as far as 
adopting unilateral tariff reductions in the 1950s (with trade union approval). It also passed 
robust anti-cartel legislation at home. Italy largely matched Germany’s opening to external 
competition, but was much less ready to thwart domestic anti-competitive forces. Monopolies or 
oligopolies had been widespread in pre-war Italy and not much was done to dismantle them in 
the reconstruction period (Rossi and Toniolo 1996; Barca 1997). This was particularly true for 
the state-owned corporations that dominated a number of sectors, notably banking and large 
scale industry (de Cecco and Giavazzi 1993). On the surface, Japan looks as having moved least 
in the direction of increased competition. The liberalization of foreign trade was slow and 
patchy until the mid-1970s (or even beyond), and, according to most observers, the anti-
monopoly legislation adopted at home lacked teeth. Yet, interestingly, most observers would 
also argue that domestic competition in industry was fierce, as the large keiretsu conglomerates 
fought for market share (Tsuru 1976; Yamamura 1982). 
An upshot of this brief discussion would suggest that Germany’s policies were first best, 
while Italy and Japan, if in different ways, were held back in establishing vibrant and 
competitive economies, in one case by the pressures of domestic vested interests, in the other by 
lingering mercantilist attitudes. Yet, arguably, Japan’s combination of competition within the 
country and protection vis-à-vis the rest of the world, may have been superior to Italy’s opposite 
set of policies. A comparative look at the two countries’ international performance shows large 
market share gains in both cases (as it also does, of course, for Germany) (Figure 2), but also 
points to a significant difference in specialization patterns. In the early 1950s, Italy and Japan 
shared comparative advantage in broadly similar lines of activity; over time, however, 
divergence set in, as shown by the evolution of revealed comparative advantage indices (Boltho 
2001b). Italy’s specialization changed only very slowly and the country remained committed to, 
admittedly increasingly sophisticated, consumer goods; Japan moved into more high-tech 
activities and this process was almost certainly helped by the protection its capital-intensive 
industries enjoyed. Active in a sheltered, but still intensely competitive environment, Japanese 
firms invested massively, slid down their average cost curves as domestic demand grew, and 
were eventually able to enter the world market, a process that has been aptly called “import 
protection for export promotion” (Krugman 1984). 
Such a sequence of events would suggest that Japan’s growth was not export-led, but that 
it was its exports that were “growth-led”; an experience not of demand-pull, but of “supply-
push”. The issue is important not only for Japan, but also for Germany and Italy, if only because 
it is often thought that all the three countries grew thanks to exports, at least in the Golden Age. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, this question has not been investigated as much as might have been 
expected. For Italy, some studies have suggested that growth was, indeed, export-led (Stern 
1967; Graziani 1998), others have argued the opposite (Ciocca, Filosa and Rey 1973); most 
statements on Germany suggest or state that exports did play a leading role (Michalski 1970; 
Hennings 1982; Giersch et al. 1992), but provide little supporting evidence; for Japan, one 
study, using five different tests, rejects the export-led growth hypothesis (Boltho 1996a). 
One obvious channel of transmission that could have favoured export-led growth would 
have been through the exchange rate. If, at the outset of the Golden Age, the lira, Deutschmark 
11or yen had been pegged at very competitive rates, this could, in a fixed exchange rate regime, 
have started a virtuous circle of rising exports, investment and growth. Qualitative statements on 
whether the exchange rates that were chosen in 1949-50 were undervalued, suggest that this was 
not the case. The lira’s rate in 1950 is seen as “realistic” (Ciocca 2007, p. 238); Germany’s rate 
as broadly appropriate (Hennings 1982; Giersch et al. 1992); Japan’s as “about right” 
(Yoshikawa 1995, p. 112). Looking at the relationship of the post-war (dollar) exchange rate 
relative to the pre-war one in terms of the evolution of the GDP deflator or of wholesale prices, 
suggests that, of the three countries, it was only Germany that could claim to have gained a 
substantial advantage. Evolutions in the 1950s and 1960s, show, if anything, mild appreciation 
in Germany and Japan, but some depreciation in Italy (Boltho 1996a, 1996b). 
Two further pieces of evidence can be added. The replication of a simple test (Caves 
1971)
10, are presented in Table 4. These suggest that it was only in Germany that prices and 
quantities moved in the same direction, thus hinting at the presence of export-led growth. 
Neither the Italian nor the Japanese data show the same pattern. Alternatively, one can look at 
whether IGJ had an initial specialization on goods and/or on markets that subsequently 
experienced rapid growth. Caeteris paribus, this would have facilitated an export-led stimulus 
since (in the presence of elastic domestic supplies), buoyant demand abroad would have 
provided the trigger. The existing evidence suggests that this was definitely not the case for 
Japan which, initially, and at least through the 1950s, was specialized in goods and markets 
whose demand grew relatively slowly (National Institute 1963; Panić and Rajan 1971). Italy 
and, especially, Germany were in a somewhat more favourable position (Table 4). Overall, if a 
conclusion can be reached, it is that Japan clearly did not benefit from export-led growth, that 
Italy probably did not, while for Germany the verdict remains open. More broadly, what would 
seem indisputable is that Japan’s experience was particularly remarkable. In barely two decades, 
the country redirected its export from slowly growing developing countries to the much richer 
developed markets and changed its export structure from cheap consumer goods to high quality 
durable or investment goods.  
A controversial conclusion could follow from this experience: the relatively protectionist 
policies which Japan adopted gave the country an international specialization pattern that turned 
out to be more favourable than did the relatively liberal policies followed by Italy. Germany also 
followed such liberal policies, but was from the beginning already strongly established in 
investment goods and high-tech products. Had Italy followed a Japanese path, its longer-run 
performance might have been more favourable (de Cecco 1971). Two arguments, however, 
militate against this thesis. First, Italy’s free trade choice was politically inevitable. It would 
have been virtually impossible for a defeated country to refuse the open hand of cooperation 
offered by the European integration efforts of the 1950s. And even if it had, implausibly, 
shunned this open hand, it is difficult to see how Italy could have embarked on a successful 
industrial policy in view of the limited competition prevalent on the home market and the much 
                                                 
10 “Relatively simple price-quantity data should often suffice to show whether the growth of exports conveys a 
foreign disturbance to the economy or rather results from the expansion of domestic capacity. If disturbances arise 
predominantly from external demand, price and quantity changes should be positively correlated, if the 
disturbances arise from shifts in domestic supply, the correlation would be negative” (Caves 1971, pp. 426-427). 
12greater political interference that prevailed in economic policy-making (Gros-Pietro 1990; Prodi 
and De Giovanni 1990). 
Overall, looking at Italy’s Golden Age experience in the light of those of Germany and 
Japan, an impressionistic judgement would be that Italy broadly matched those countries’ 
growth rates, and this despite some less favourable pre-conditions. If shortfalls there were, these 
lie not so much in macroeconomic performance, but in the labour market and social policy 
areas. Italy did not achieve full employment, as did Germany and Japan, largely because of its 
pronounced regional differentials. Italy also faced a wage shock at the end of the 1960s. So did 
Germany, but its wage increases were not accompanied by the wave of strikes that were an 
integral part of the Autunno caldo movement,
11 nor did they bring about lasting changes in 
labour market regulation, as was the case in Italy. The Italian literature tends to lay the blame 
for this episode on the whole development process since the war: “In some sense the social 
conflicts of those years were an almost natural response to the speed and complexity of Italy’s 
economic development. In a relatively short time-span, the country had moved from a mainly 
agricultural structure to one of widespread industrialization, with extraordinary migration flows 
… and with a huge increase in the rate of urbanization” (Signorini and Visco 1997). More 
specifically, the intensity of strike activity in 1969-70 has been attributed to the productivity 
gains and unemployment that were imposed on the work force following the 1964-65 recession 
and to the very poor working and living conditions which faced the huge number of migrants 
who arrived in the North of the country (Valli 1977; Castronovo 1995; Graziani 1998). 
There is a clear contrast here with Germany and Japan. Both these countries also saw large 
productivity gains, but without strikes, probably because co-determination in Germany and 
cooperative industrial relations in Japan facilitated their acceptance by the work force. Nor were 
urbanization and migration uniquely Italian phenomena. Both Germany and Japan had seen, just 
after the war, the immigration of 10 million or so refugees from Eastern Europe, or the 
repatriation of 5 or 6 million nationals from the erstwhile empire. Despite the fears of the time, 
their incorporation into the labour force was relatively smooth. Both countries then saw further 
migration during the Golden Age (Japan’s almost certainly larger than Italy’s), as agricultural 
employment dwindled.
12 Germany, in addition, received some 6½ million foreigners. The 3½ to 
4 million Southern Italians who moved to the Centre-North between 1955 and 1973 were not an 
impossible number to manage. 
In other words, where Italy appears to have failed (at least in relative terms) was in its 
inability to accompany rapid economic change with parallel changes in social welfare and in the 
provision of infrastructure (other than the motorways demanded by the car industry). This 
inability, in turn, led to an over-reaction. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the hasty adoption 
of generous welfare provisions and the beginning of indiscriminate hand-outs for business, 
                                                 
11 According to ILO data, the number of working days lost in strikes in 1969-70 averaged over 29 million in Italy, 
as against only 170,000 in Germany. 
12 In Japan, gross internal migration into the richer areas averaged 1½ per cent of those regions’ population between 
the early 1950s and 1973, in Germany and Italy the figure was 0.8 per cent (net migration from “poor” to “rich” 
was, however, smaller in Germany than in Italy; no comparable figures were found for Japan). 
13measures that gave the politicians much greater scope for interfering with economic policy-
making. Many of the fiscal problems encountered in the 1970s and 1980s have their origin in 
the belated and misguided responses to the late 1960s crisis. Both migration and welfare reform 
were clearly managed more smoothly and successfully by Germany and Japan.  
The experience of the late 1960s thus points to a major, Italian problem. Relative to 
Germany and Japan, administrative ability (by both politicians and the civil service) seems to 
have been in short supply and this must have affected economic performance, be it because of 
more pervasive rent-seeking activities, slower judicial procedures, worse infrastructure 
provisions, etc. Evidence confirming this judgment is not available for the late 1960s, but over 
the last 30 years indicators have emerged that put Italy into a much less favourable position than 
the other two countries, be this in the areas of an intrusive regulatory environment, the provision 
of law and order, the control of corruption, the existence of trust, etc. (Mauro 1995; Knack and 
Kiefer 1997). More recent World Bank investigations for 1996-2009 confirm this. In all but one 
of the governance indicators that are covered by that institution, Italy is significantly below 
Germany and Japan. And an even more damning picture is painted by survey evidence on 
overall infrastructure quality: in recent international comparisons of 125 countries, Germany 
was ranked 6th, Japan 16th and Italy 73rd (World Economic Forum, various years).  
4. Slowdown 
A bird’s eye view of developments in this period (Table 1) suggests that trends (and also 
cycles) were not that dissimilar in IGJ. All three countries slowed down relative to the Golden 
Age largely because the potential provided by catch-up had greatly diminished. Yet, on average, 
they still managed to expand, at, or slightly above, the OECD’s growth rate at the time. All three 
experienced the same number of recessions, two in the wake of the oil shocks of the mid-1970s 
and early 1980s and a third one in the early 1990s, and all three recorded strong upswings in 
activity in the late 1970s and in the late 1980s. The parallels, however, stop here as in most 
other respects, IGJ went into their separate ways. By far the most glaring contrast was probably 
in the area of macroeconomic policies, with Italy behaving in ways that were almost opposite to 
those of Germany and Japan.  
The early years of the period were strongly affected by the oil shocks. Oil dependence in 
the three economies was similar. Yet, the wage (and therefore, price) responses of the three 
economies varied widely (Table 5). In Italy and Japan wage pressures surged in 1974-76, while 
German unions showed commendable restraint. The lesson was learnt in Japan where behaviour 
after the second oil shock was as prudent as in Germany. Italian unions, on the other hand, went 
on oblivious of the consequences for the country’s real disposable income of the sharp terms of 
trade deterioration that had occurred.  
The most glaring difference between the three countries was in macroeconomic policies, 
particularly so in the fiscal domain (Table 6). In Italy, the budget deficit averaged some 10 per 
cent of GDP for 20 years and the public debt/GDP ratio rose to 120 per cent by 1995. Public 
debt also rose in Germany and in Japan, but this happened only late in the period, in response to 
the costs of unification in one case and the recession induced by the bursting of a speculative 
14bubble in the other. In Italy, the reasons for fiscal incontinence are to be found instead in the 
politicians’ aim to buy social peace. “Frenetic activism” (Arcelli and Micossi 1997, p. 280) was 
the defining characteristic of a policy that was used to raise pensions, improve health provisions, 
boost public payrolls, subsidize industry, etc. Political expedience rather than economic 
rationality ruled decision-making: “The struggle for income shares was shifted from the factory 
floor to the state’s budget” (Maier 1999, p. 281). Conversion to a more orthodox stance came 
only late in the period, as the deadline for entry into European Monetary Union (EMU) 
approached. 
Monetary policy was permissive in the second half of the 1970s, but was tightened in the 
early 1980s. An indirect indicator for this is provided by the level of real short-term interest 
rates (roughly measured by using an ex-post deflator). These were virtually identical to those of 
Germany and Japan (and significantly higher than Germany’s in the years 1981-90) (Table 6). 
Two events were important in the monetary policy conversion to greater orthodoxy: entry into 
the EMS in 1979 and a first step towards granting more independence to the Bank of Italy, by 
freeing it from the obligation to buy Treasury bonds, in 1981 (Basevi and Onofri 1997). 
Interestingly, however, real long-term rates, while positive,
13 remained below those of the more 
prudent Germany and Japan (and were probably even lower than here shown if a more 
appropriate “expected inflation” indicator had been used to deflate the nominal rates). Clearly, 
having a large pool of domestic savings greatly facilitates public sector financing, as also shown 
by Japan’s experience in more recent years. 
Yet, surprisingly perhaps, in the light of relative monetary tightness, Italian inflation 
remained in double digit until the mid-1980s, significantly outstripping the inflation rates of 
Germany and Japan. One reason for this may have been the lack of competition that prevailed in 
the economy, particularly in many service sectors (Ciocca 2007) (the same was probably true in 
Japan, but much less so in Germany). A second one had to do with the attitude of the largest 
trade union confederation which opposed any form of incomes policy until as late as 1992 
(ibid.). German and Japanese unions were much more conscious of macroeconomic constraints. 
And a third one can lay blame on the public sector’s continuing increases in employment, in 
wages, and in income maintenance transfers (Arcelli and Micossi 1997). On the other hand the 
hope that joining the EMS would have had favourable expectational effects on wage bargaining, 
now that the country’s monetary policy was, de facto, in the hands of the Bundesbank, did not 
materialize (Egebo and Englander 1992).
14 Partly as a consequence, sharp nominal depreciation, 
led to no real depreciation (Table 6); indeed the opposite was the case until 1993. Between 1973 
and 1992, while the nominal rate fell by two thirds, the real one rose by 20 per cent. It was only 
following EMS ejection and much tougher macroeconomic policies that Italy finally gained a 
significant competitive advantage. 
                                                 
13 Long-term bond rates for the period as a whole averaged 4.0 and 3.3 per cent in Germany and Japan respectively, 
but only 1.8 per cent in Italy. 
14 In the end, this was not so surprising. Earlier British and American experience had already shown that the effects 
on expectations of “regime changes” can be significant for financial markets but are hard to detect on labour 
markets. Paradoxically, this can raise the “sacrifice ratio” of disinflation manoeuvres that stress such expectational 
effects. 
15In addition, the country was also plagued by a host of tight regulations. Labour market 
rigidities were almost certainly more pronounced than in either Germany or Japan, be this in the 
area of employment protection or in that of collective bargaining, given the virtual absence of 
co-ordinated wage negotiations (Nickell et al. 2005). Capital and exchange controls were 
pervasive, as were price controls: it was estimated that at the end of the 1970s the government 
directly or indirectly controlled up to 30 per cent of the items in the consumer price basket 
(Arcelli and Micossi 1997). More generally, the Fraser Index of “Economic Freedom” 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2009), a measure which tries to quantify all the ways in which a 
government interferes with market forces, placed Italy significantly below both Germany and 
Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, even though Italy did make some progress from 1985 to the late 
1990s (Figure 3). 
Italy thus suffered in the period from constant macroeconomic mismanagement and from 
excessive microeconomic interference in much more virulent forms than either Germany or 
Japan. Normally, one would expect that this would have led to very serious economic 
difficulties. Conversely, the lesser regulations and controls of Germany and Japan, as well as 
their much more restrained fiscal and monetary policies, should have allowed both these 
economies to perform much better than Italy. Yet, a cursory look at Table 1 shows that, as far as 
economic growth went, there is not that much to choose between IGJ. And the same holds for 
employment and productivity growth, both of which rose more rapidly in Italy than they did in 
Germany, though not than in Japan. In other words, nominal developments in the three countries 
may have been very different, but real ones were not. Two possible (and not mutually exclusive) 
explanations for such a surprising outcome can be advanced: the first one could argue that the 
costs of fiscal profligacy and partial monetary accommodation are perhaps not as high as is 
often thought; the second one might point to other forces that, at least partially, offset Italy’s 
“wrong” policies. 
For the earlier part of this period at least, there is some research that suggests that the 
policy mix chosen by the Italian authorities was not that sub-optimal after all (Boltho 1986; 
Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989). The latter authors, in particular, argue that initial monetary 
accommodation, especially of the second oil shock, allowed profits to remain high and therefore 
sustained later investment demand, even though monetary policy had by then turned restrictive. 
The inevitable output and employment disinflation costs were thus much lower than they 
otherwise would have been (and, in any case, much lower than those inflicted on the UK 
economy by the non-accommodating British policies of the time). Gradual, if only slow, 
disinflation through the 1980s was thus probably more growth-promoting (or less growth-
retarding) than British shock therapy, or the unnecessarily strict policies followed by Germany 
throughout the period (Carlin 1996). 
The second explanation would instead point to something that, arguably, went “right” in 
the Italy at the time: the employment shift from large to medium and small-scale firms (SMEs), 
particularly in manufacturing. This shift was neither unique to Italy nor to the period. It had 
been happening already in the 1950s and 1960s in Italy and in many other industrialized 
economies, in response to both taste diversification and technological improvements which were 
gradually reducing the importance of large-scale economies. It was, however, particularly 
16pronounced in Italy in these years, partly in response to the labour market rigidities introduced 
into large factories by the strike waves of the late 1960s. A rough proxy for this phenomenon 
(the importance of firms or establishments with 10 to 99 workers) is shown in Table 7. It will be 
seen that the rising share of these firms, while predating the Autunno caldo, was especially 
marked in the 1970s and 1980s, in contrast to much less noticeable changes in Germany or 
Japan. Indeed, it may be thanks to the added flexibility which these developments generated that 
Italy managed to hold its share of world manufacturing exports in these years (Figure 2), while 
Germany and Japan suffered pronounced losses (admittedly from much higher initial levels). 
There are two possible interpretations of this period. According to one view, Italy suffered 
from prolonged macro- and microeconomic mismanagement and grew only thanks to its 
proverbial flexibility, provided by a dense and rising network of SMEs. Had it embraced 
orthodox policies with greater conviction, and deregulation and reform with more vigour, its 
performance would, surely, have been much more favourable. An alternative view, while 
accepting the importance of SME flexibility, might question the judgment about policy. 
Germany, after all, epitomized macroeconomic orthodoxy, yet its overall performance was 
below that of Italy.
15 As for Japan, it went for financial deregulation with abandon and found 
itself first in a bubble and then in a bust whose consequences are still with the country today. 
Perhaps after all, high rates of inflation and large budget deficits are not as destructive of 
economic activity as the orthodox literature suggests; indeed, deficits may well have sustained 
demand (Salvati 2011). Italy eventually converged on the recommendations of that orthodox 
literature, but its gradual shift in that direction may have been preferable to a more immediately 
rigorous policy, given, in particular, that the country did not benefit from the wage bargaining 
institutions and implicit social consensus of Germany and Japan.  
5. Stagnation 
While IGJ may have seen somewhat different macroeconomic evolutions in the 20 years 
that followed the first oil shock, the next decade and a half was, again, characterized by greater 
similarities. Over 1995-2011, all three countries experienced near stagnation in per capita 
income growth. The rest of the OECD area did not perform very brilliantly either, but IGJ fell 
significantly short of the average. Indeed, for total GDP, they were the slowest growing of the 
22 countries of the “old” OECD area over this period.
16 Japan’s performance was particularly 
remarkable: given pervasive price deflation, its nominal GDP in 2011 is now estimated to lie 
below its value for 1995. Germany, on the other hand, while growing slowly, particularly 
between 2000 and 2005, recovered very strongly at the end of the “Great Recession”, thanks to a 
surge in exports made possible by a prolonged phase of earlier wage moderation. This, in turn, 
seems to have reflected a consensus between firms and trade unions (no doubt facilitated by co-
determination) on the need for external competitiveness in exchange for employment 
guarantees.  
                                                 
15 It is true that it was burdened with the costs of reunification after 1991, but the growth shortfall was already more 
than one decade old. 
16 On a per capita basis, France, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland are below Germany’s 1.3 per cent annual 
growth, but are still way ahead of Japan’s and Italy’s dismal figures. 
17One possible explanation for these trends could be linked to the process of globalization 
which accelerated in these years. IGJ were bound to suffer more than other OECD countries 
from the shifting of industry to emerging economies because of their greater dependence on 
manufacturing. Industry’s share of valued added in IGJ is among the highest in the advanced 
countries.
17 Since resources are not instantly mobile, a process of de-industrialization is bound 
to have negative effects on employment and output. This was particularly true for Italy, where 
the weight of industry declined quite sharply between 1995 and 2009 (interestingly, however, 
this was much less the case in Germany). 
Clearly, and hardly surprisingly, globalization affected IGJ differently according to 
whether their industrial structures were complementary to, or competitive with, those of the 
newly emerging economies with whom trade soared. Germany and Japan were almost certainly 
likely to benefit more from (and be hurt less by) this new competition, than was Italy. Demand 
from rapidly growing developing economies is bound to be strong for high-tech and investment 
goods. Both these represent higher shares of exports in Germany and/or Japan than they do in 
Italy.
18 Germany, in addition, appears to have greatly benefited from the opening of Eastern 
Europe, an area with which it had traditionally had close relations. Figure 4 shows how 
Germany’s imports and exports with the countries of this area rose as a share of total trade.
19 
Something similar happened to Japan’s trade with China. Italy, partly for obvious geographic 
and historical reasons, was left behind. But then neither France nor Spain, to take just two 
European examples, shared Germanys’ commodity composition of exports or tight links with 
Eastern Europe, yet, they did not perform as poorly as Italy. 
A further tentative explanation for Italy’s relative failure may, paradoxically, come from 
its earlier successes. It was argued in Section  3  above that the export performance of the 
industrial districts had been particularly strong in the 1980s and 1990s, and this despite the fact 
that SMEs tend to do less well on foreign markets than larger firms (Barba Navaretti et al. 
2010). Globalization, however, may have weakened the SMEs that dominate these districts 
(Ciocca 2007). Not only do they often have to compete with emerging countries that specialize 
in similar products but enjoy much lower labour costs. They also find it more difficult and 
expensive, because of their limited size, to delocalize some of their activities, something that 
larger German or Japanese firms were able to do on a significant scale in Eastern Europe and 
                                                 
17 In 2008, for instance, value added in manufacturing ranged between 18.1 per cent of GDP in Italy, 20 per cent in 
Japan and as much as 22.7 per cent in Germany, as against figures of the order of 12 to 13 per cent in Britain, 
France or the United States. 
18 Thus, World Bank estimates put the share of high-tech exports in total manufactured exports in 2009 at 20 per 
cent in Japan and 16 per cent in Germany, but only 8 per cent in Italy. The weight of investment goods (defined as 
SITC categories 71 to 77) in total exports is more similar. In 2008 these represented 37 per cent of Japanese sales 
abroad, but 28 per cent in both Germany and Italy. 
19 Imports are also shown in the chart because outsourcing figures strongly in Germany’s trade links with Eastern 
Europe. Indeed, outsourcing and the threat to jobs this represented are almost certainly a major explanation for why 
earnings in Germany have grown much more slowly than they have in Italy since the creation of monetary union, 
thus providing the country with real depreciation within the currency area. 
18China respectively.
20 A production model that seemed well suited to the European market at the 
end of the 20
th century, may perhaps be less appropriate to the more globalized world of the 
early 21
st century. 
A second set of explanations turns to more institutional reasons for relative stagnation. It 
has been argued that the institutions that Continental Europe (and, arguably, also Japan) 
developed during the Golden Age, became gradually less suited to the changing conditions of 
the world at the turn of the century (Eichengreen 2007). In an environment of rising 
technological uncertainty, it is venture capital and flexible financial markets that are needed, not 
bank-based financial systems (ibid.). Similarly, the new growth requirements are to be found in 
R&D and in human capital improvements, rather than in fixed investment. And even within 
research and development, the emphasis has to change from the incremental innovations, for 
which German firms, for instance, are well known, to the radical innovations characteristic of 
US firms (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
In addition one can also list the criticisms levied by international organizations at the 
sclerotic institutions of Europe and Japan. Given the emergence of nimbler competitors, it has 
been argued, public sectors had to be more efficient, marginal tax rates had to be reduced and 
bloated welfare provisions had to be slimmed down; even more importantly, competition in 
product and, especially, in labour markets had to be encouraged, etc. (OECD 1989). There is 
room to cast doubt on some of these propositions. The evidence linking, for instance, reforms of 
the labour market to lower unemployment outcomes is virtually non-existent (Howell et al. 
2007). And even the links between success and R&D expenditure seem far from proven. Figure 
5, for instance, shows very clear differences in the research efforts of IGJ over this period. 
While Italy’s poor research effort correlates with its poor macroeconomic performance, Japan’s 
impressive data do not (though, it is true, of course, that the country might have done even 
worse had it not been for its R&D efforts). Still, few would doubt that there were sclerotic 
institutions in many OECD countries, and that some reforms were, and still are, indispensable. 
And it may well be that these sclerotic institutions are more prevalent in IGJ than elsewhere. 
One piece of evidence which might indirectly support this would be the relative presence/ 
absence of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the plausible assumption that multinational 
corporations shun overregulated economies. It turns out that between 1995 and 2010 (or 
between 1980 and 2010, for that matter), FDI inflows, in per cent of GDP, have been lower in 
IGJ than in any single other OECD country.
21 
A third (and linked) set of arguments would suggest that IGJ did not only have many 
institutions that were unsuited to the new economy, but were also reluctant to change them. This 
would seem to be broadly true, at least when IGJ are compared with what happened in other 
advanced economies. Figure 3 above had already illustrated how the reform efforts of IGJ have 
                                                 
20 There may well be some truth to the simple view that it is much easier for Siemens to be in China than it is for 
Sassuolo (the capital of the Italian ceramic tile industry) given the multitude of firms that compose it. This being 
said, it is well known that numerous firms in Italy’s clothing industrial districts, in particular, have successfully 
outsourced many of their activities to Eastern Europe. 
21 The only, small, exception is provided by Germany which, in the years 1995-2010, was somewhat more 
attractive than Greece, but still well below all the other OECD countries 
19been relatively modest, indeed non-existent in Italy, since 2000. More detailed data on selected 
aspects of regulation present a mixed picture (Table 8). Progress in Italy, by the standards of 
Germany, Japan and other OECD economies, is in evidence in the area of labour market 
rigidity. There seems also to have been some improvement in the ease with which business is 
conducted. The two major indicators which for Italy show no improvement are the legal ones. 
Judicial procedures still take an inordinately long time and the presence of the rule of law seems 
to have sharply decreased relative to what was happening elsewhere. In addition, economic 
performance must also have suffered given the presence, through much of the period, of what 
must have been the worst government Italy has had since World War II. 
That progress in reforms has been slow would not have come as a surprise to Olson. One 
of his main arguments was that, as democracies grow in peace-time, so does the importance of 
their distributional coalitions. And these, in turn, “slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new 
technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce 
the rate of economic growth” (Olson 1982, p. 74). IGJ may not have swept away their 
distributional coalitions just after the war, but they may well have presided over a gradual build-
up in their importance through time. It is not easy, however, to muster much evidence in favour 
of this thesis. Trade unions and monopolies (or oligopolies) are the two major culprits of 
Olsonian institutional sclerosis. Yet, the importance of unions has clearly shrunk over the last 
10-20 years under the influence of labour market deregulation, massive immigration (at least in 
Italy and Germany), globalization, and the structural changes that have reduced the importance 
of heavily unionized public enterprises or large scale factories. Thus, most OECD countries, 
including IGJ, have seen significant declines in unionization and in strike activity (Table 9). As 
for restrictive product market practices, these must also have been weakened by deregulation 
and, more importantly, by the much higher degree of competition brought about by freeing 
world trade through successive GATT/WTO liberalization rounds and, within Europe, by the 
1992 Single Market Programme. Most of these trends were shared by IGJ (even if, it has been 
argued, the extent of domestic competition has tended to decrease in Italy over time, despite all 
this (Ciocca 2007)). 
It is true, however, that in IGJ, as well as in other OECD countries, resistance to change 
would seem to be strong. Low social mobility could be one reason, particularly for Italy. A 
recent survey of intergenerational income persistence suggests, for instance, that in Western 
Europe this is lowest in Italy, together with Spain  (Causa et al. 2009), and, according to earlier 
work, certainly also lower than in Germany (D’Addio 2007) (no data were found for Japan). 
One would need, however, evidence on whether this has declined through time before arguing 
that it may have added to Italy’s lack of dynamism in recent years. A more plausible candidate 
for this could come from trends in the wealth of the population. Figure 6 shows changes in the 
ratio of net household wealth to income in IGJ and in three other major OECD countries. 
Abstracting from the strong fluctuations that came with the bursting of bubbles in Japan in the 
early 1990s and in Britain and the US in the late 2000s, what the chart clearly shows is that IGJ, 
and Italy in particular, are among the wealthiest societies on earth. It is not implausible to 
suggest that there could well be a link between “higher private wealth, a reduced propensity to 
20undertake effort and risk, and a deceleration in the pace of economic development” (Ciocca 
2007, p. 346). 
Finally, one further reason for semi-stagnation could come from the rapid population 
ageing of IGJ – in 2010 they had highest shares in the world of the over 65s in their populations 
(Figure 7). The links between demography and economics are obviously complex. Yet, common 
sense would suggest that there must be some truth in the simple saying that: “old men do not 
like change; old men do not take new initiatives”. The difficulties in reducing the welfare state 
can clearly be linked to ageing, as the median voter’s age rises and he/she is increasingly 
attached to his/her health and pension benefits. Similarly, decelerating productivity growth 
could be linked to lack of new initiatives. Survey evidence suggests, for instance, that older 
people are less entrepreneurial,
22 and that there is less entrepreneurial activity in ageing 
countries.
23 If there is something in this hypothesis, then at least a partial explanation for why 
IGJ performed relatively poorly in recent years would be forthcoming. Unfortunately, of course, 
it is not an explanation that augurs well for the future given that ageing will continue for many 
years to come. 
6.  The Regional Problems 
Regional differentials in output, employment, living standards, etc. exist in all countries. 
In Italy, however, they are particularly pronounced, at least if compared with those of Germany 
and Japan. The left-hand panel of Figure 8 presents a simple measure of geographic inequalities: 
the (weighted) coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita for 11 regions in IGJ (and also 
for 16 regions in Germany after unification). The chart speaks for itself. Throughout the period, 
Italian differentials are by an order of magnitude larger than those of West Germany and Japan. 
A particular feature of Italy’s differential is that it corresponds to a clear-cut division 
between two parts of the country (the Centre-North and the South), much more so than do the 
(smaller) German and Japanese differentials. The income gap between the Mezzogiorno and the 
Centre-North of Italy is also plotted in Figure 8 together with tentative estimates of roughly 
similar gaps in Germany and Japan. For Germany, the choice of a comparable indicator is 
simple after 1991. Unification brought together two regions at very different levels of 
development which are geographically clearly distinct. Before 1991, on the other hand, the 
richer and poorer regions of Western Germany were spread across the country. The indicator 
used shows the ratio of GDP per capita in four poorer Länder to that of the other more fortunate 
seven  Länder.
24 For Japan, a slightly more geography-based approach was possible. The 
country was separated into a Central and relatively rich area and a more peripheral part made up 
                                                 
22 The EU’s Eurobarometer surveys on entrepreneurship show, for instance, that the percentage of people thinking 
of creating, or having created, a new enterprise is significantly higher among those aged 25-39 years and, to a lesser 
extent, 40-54 years, than it is among the over 55s. 
23 International surveys of entrepreneurship, as those presented by, for instance, the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor or International Entrepreneurship show that entrepreneurial activity tends to be lower in countries with a 
high percentage of the elderly than it is in “younger” economies. 
24 The four poorer ones (with GDP per capita below the West German average in both 1960 and 2008) are 
Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. 
21of the North of the country, together with the various islands to the South.
25 In both 
comparisons, the Italian gap stands out for both its size and persistence. Even East Germany, 
despite suffering from a much larger gap vis-à-vis the West of the country at the time of 
unification, has been able in more recent years to close a good deal of the difference. 
                                                
The obvious question this raises is how much Italy’s performance was affected by the 
presence of such a major territorial divergence. At one very simple level, had the Mezzogiorno 
not existed, Italy would have been a much richer country. Already in the early 1950s, GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity in the Centre-North was probably above that of both Germany 
and Japan, and the same would be broadly true today. This, however, is obviously far too 
simplistic not only because willing away the Mezzogiorno is not a feasible option, but also 
because, in its absence, many other things would also have differed in the country’s economic 
history over the period. 
A somewhat more realistic approach might alter the region’s development. One relatively 
simple, way would be to assume that, contrary to what happened, Italy would have conformed to 
a regional convergence rule which has been shown to apply to a number of advanced economies  
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). According to this rule, the gap between poor and rich regions 
has tended to decline by some 2 per cent per annum, be this in the US, in Japan or in Western 
Europe. Had Italy shared in this 2 per cent convergence process, the GDP per capita (constant 
price) differential between the two regions would have shrunk over the period from nearly 40 to 
10 per cent, and the country’s overall growth rate would have been somewhat higher. Over the 
1953-2008 years, for instance, annual per capita GDP growth would have reached 3.7 rather 
than the recorded 3.4 per cent, with the South itself growing at 4.0 instead of 3.1 per cent. 
The results just obtained assume, however, that nothing else would have changed had the 
Mezzogiorno  been more successful. This is clearly an untenable proposition, as several 
important variables would clearly have behaved differently. Thus: 
i)  More rapid income and employment growth in the South would have reduced 
migration flows to the Centre-North; this, in turn, would have made for higher wages 
and lower international competitiveness, at least in the 1950s and in the 1960s; 
ii)  On the other hand, a more successful Southern economy might itself have developed 
some competitive tradeable sectors; 
iii)  Equally, a more successful Southern economy would have required a smaller public 
policy effort; tax rates might thus have been lower and/or public expenditure might 
have been used for alternative (growth or welfare enhancing) purposes. 
Quantifying such counterfactual experiments is not easy. A first step is to assess the 
diminished push for migration in the presence of faster income convergence between North and 
South. Since net migration diminished drastically from the mid-1970s onwards, it is only in the 
1950s and 1960s that such an effect would have been important. While the actual income gap 
over the years 1955-73 (for which migration data exist) fell only slightly, it would have shrunk 
 
25 The Southern islands are Kyushu, Shikoku and Okinawa; the North is made up of Hokkaido and Tohoku. 
22from nearly 40 to just over 20 per cent of Northern per capita GDP had the Mezzogiorno 
converged at 2 per cent per annum. Assuming an elasticity of migration flows with respect to 
changes in this gap of -2, derived from the literature,
26 migration to the Centre-North in the 
years 1955-73 would have been reduced by, perhaps, 90,000 people per annum. Even assuming 
that migrants had a very high participation rate (70 per cent) and that half of them entered the 
manufacturing sector (both rather extreme assumptions), the reduction in the Centre-North’s 
industrial work force would have been at most of some 7 to 8 per cent over the period as a 
whole.  
The available evidence on the so-called “wage curve” suggests that changes in labour 
supply have only small effects on compensation levels. A consensus estimate is that the wage 
elasticity with respect to unemployment in developed countries, including Italy, is of roughly -
0.1 per cent (Blanchflower and Oswald 1992; Nijkamp and Poot 2005). Incorporating such a 
figure, and even assuming a 10 per cent reduction in the Centre-North’s labour force, would 
have resulted in only a 1 per cent increase in the compensation levels of the country’s industrial 
work force and, perhaps, an even lower increase in unit labour costs (since lesser labour 
availability might also have induced somewhat higher productivity). Given a possible export 
elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate of -1,
27 export and overall output growth would 
have been reduced by perhaps 1 and 0.2 per cent respectively, thus not even fully undoing the 
favourable impact on national GDP growth of faster Southern convergence.  
This extremely simplified calculation ignores, however, a number of other features that 
would have operated in the opposite direction. First, Northern industry might have engaged in 
more capital-deepening investment. Second, in the presence of faster income growth, Southern 
industry might have developed some competitive tradeable goods and/or services, in line with a 
hypothesis that postulates that fast growing countries generate increased exports (Krugman 
1989). Third, and most importantly, it was argued in Section 2 that much of the strike wave that 
characterized the late 1960s and then led to a significant increase in labour market rigidities in 
the 1970s, may have been, in part at least, a response to badly managed migration flows. In the 
presence of more subdued migration Italy’s economic history over these years could well have 
been different. Quantifying these various effects is beyond the scope of this paper, but an 
impressionistic judgment might well be that, over the longer run, they could have been a at least 
as important, if not more so, than any negative first round effects of a somewhat lower labour 
supply elasticity in the Northern part of the country in the years 1955-73. 
                                                 
26 Though estimates of elasticities of regional migration flows to changes in relative regional incomes (controlling 
for other variables such as unemployment and distance), can vary considerably across time and country, an earlier 
summary conclusion was that “most of the elasticities of migration with respect to income have been greater than 
1.0 but less than 3.0” (Gallaway et al. 1975, p. 262). For present purposes, use was therefore made of (a rounded-
up) result obtained specifically for Italy over the 1958-74 years (1.8 for relative wages) (Salvatore 1977). 
27 It is difficult to find reliable figures for international trade elasticities for the 1950s and 1960s. A well known 
survey of the time could not find statistically significant results for Italy (Houthakker and Magee 1969). For eight 
other advanced countries for which such results were obtained, the average estimate was of the order of -1.0 (ibid.). 
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aid to the Mezzogiorno. Over the period as a whole, aid to the South may have averaged 1 to 1½ 
per cent of GDP per annum (Boltho 2010). Assuming that, as the per capita GDP gap shrank, 
efforts to help the South would have similarly diminished, Italian public expenditure and/or 
taxation levels would have been somewhat lower than they were. A conservative estimate might 
put the potential savings at perhaps ½ a per cent of GDP per annum. Had this been reflected in 
lower taxation, it might have generated some (small) positive impact on entrepreneurship and 
growth. Had it been used in more productive forms of expenditure (e.g. infrastructure rather 
than income maintenance payments or subsidies), it would almost certainly have had (somewhat 
larger) positive effects on growth. And to these benefits, should be added the likelihood of lower 
rent-seeking and crime in the South (fostered by high levels of public spending), and, perhaps, 
no Lega. 
Summarising these various arguments, one could come to a simple (and, surely, broadly 
acceptable) conclusion: had the Mezzogiorno’s history over the last 60 years been more 
favourable, Italy would have clearly benefited. More rapid expansion in the South would have 
stimulated economic growth to the tune of, say, a ¼ per cent per annum. In addition, Italy might 
have avoided some of the costs that came from the Autunno caldo, might have used public funds 
more productively and would, almost certainly, have witnessed lower levels of criminal activity. 
Even if a somewhat higher real exchange rate would have penalized exports during the Golden 
Age, it could still be argued that had Italy’s regional problems been more similar to those of the 
two other countries, its growth over the period might well have come somewhere in between 
those of Germany and Japan (3.5 and 4.2 per cent per annum respectively) and well above the 
3.4 per cent actually recorded. 
A comparison with Germany’s regional experience since unification is also instructive in 
showing why East Germany has, so far at least, been more successful than the Mezzogiorno in 
closing its (much larger) income gap vis-à-vis the more developed part of the country. For one 
thing, the West German institutions that it adopted were, as argued earlier, almost certainly 
superior to Italian institutions in terms of “a functioning legal system, control of crime and 
corruption, efficient administration of taxes” (Carlin 2010, p. 12), etc.. In addition, East 
Germany was able to decouple itself from West German wage-setting mechanisms and unit 
labour costs declined rapidly in relative terms (ibid.).
28 Italian unions had, of course, followed 
an almost opposite pattern by enforcing wage equalization across the country in the late 1960s. 
And East Germany benefited from massive public investment into an infrastructure that, 
arguably, is now the best in Europe. 
                                                 
28 Wage moderation was one component of this decoupling. Rapid productivity growth in the tradeable sector was 
another, thanks in part to industrial policy and in part to a return to historical specialization patterns (Carlin 2010). 
247. Conclusions 
As was argued in the Introduction, the economies of IGJ have shared a number of 
similarities since World War II. The most notable has, no doubt, been success. Growth of per 
capita income was rapid through most of the period, living standards are among the highest in 
the world, relatively generous welfare provisions (undreamt of in 1950) protect most of the 
population from sudden reversals of fortune, educational and health standards are much higher 
than they were 60 years ago, etc. In addition, IGJ are also very open to the rest of the world and 
are, if not welcoming, at least accepting the invigorating inflows of immigrants (Germany more 
so than Italy, and Italy more so than Japan). 
Yet, looked at from the standpoint of Germany and Japan, there are disappointing features 
in Italy’s performance. The relative lack of substantial reforms in the reconstruction years is one 
of them. On the other hand, and surprisingly, perhaps, a more permissive macroeconomic policy 
stance may not have been as pernicious as is commonly thought. In the 1970s and 1980s when 
the monetary and fiscal policy divergences between Italy on the one hand and Germany and 
Japan on the other were at their peak, Italy’s growth performance was, in comparative 
perspective, just as good, if not better than that of the two other countries. Policy orthodoxy is 
not always conducive to rapid growth. It is true that the public debt that was created at the time 
is still burdening the country today, but this is partly due to a fiscal policy stance in most years 
of this century that was not compatible with the constraints imposed by monetary union. 
More important were three other differences that have been stressed in this paper: 
administrative inefficiencies (reflected, inter alia, in poorly working institutions and in an 
inadequate infrastructure), the failure to resolve the underdevelopment of the country’s South, 
and the near-permanent state of conflict in industrial relations. German and Japanese 
bureaucratic efficiency, functioning institutions and infrastructure quality would seem to be, on 
available evidence, greatly superior to Italy’s. Regional problems, never serious in Japan, were 
severe in Germany after unification, but have so far been tackled rather successfully. And 
industrial relations were exceptionally peaceful in Germany and Japan in comparison to Italy’s 
(Table 9). Yet, despite all this conflict, income distribution in Italy is much less equal than in 
Germany and, at least until recently, in Japan. 
Behind these differences lies probably a further difference with much older roots: the 
incapacity of the Italian state compared to that of the two other countries to efficiently run a 
modern economy. This incapacity is easily seen in the area of regional development where vast 
funds were wasted, often in rent-seeking activities and corruption. But it also permeates the area 
of industrial relations. Seldom did the state try to play a pacifying role (as in various ways it did 
in Germany and Japan). The mismanagement of internal migration in the 1960s is just one 
example of government shortcomings; the almost total failure of promoting reforms since 2000 
(other than for some purely ad-personam changes in the area of judicial procedures) is another. 
And while Germany (through tax policy) and Japan (through industrial policy) helped the 
formation of what has been called “patient” capital, Italy, since the 1960s, had no such 
ambitions. Its corporate sector gave priority to short-termism, capital flight and continuing 
requests for public aid. Ultimately, Italy paid the price for remaining profoundly divided 
25between a business class that, at best, patronized trade unions and looked only for immediate 
profits, and a trade union movement whose significant anti-capitalist component was largely 
oblivious to any form of economic constraint (Salvati 2000). Germany was spared such 
ideological conflicts (Hennings 1982), while Japan never really encountered them. 
As was rightly argued, Germany and Japan have shown through time a capacity to 
efficiently take and manage major decisions, a capacity that Italy lacks (Salvati 1984). Had the 
country had a more efficient state and more cooperative industrial relations, its regional 
problems would probably have been less severe, and its growth performance would almost 
certainly have been significantly better than what was recorded. As it is, this performance was 
very respectable. Italy today enjoys living standards that are not much below those of Germany 
and Japan and grew nearly as rapidly as they did, despite the constraints it faced. The regret is 
that so much more could have been achieved. 
This is particularly true at present. The last 15 years have seen very slow growth in the 
OECD area, but particularly so in IGJ. Some reasons for this poor performance are common to 
the three countries (e.g. demography and, possibly, the dampening effects of earlier successes 
and rapid wealth accumulation). Japan, in addition, is still paying the consequences of two 
decades of deflation. Germany, on the other hand, has recently been able, through a concerted 
effort on the part of companies and trade unions, to re-conquer external competitiveness. 
Germany’s wage flexibility is particularly noteworthy. In the East of the country it has promoted 
convergence; in the West it has stimulated exports. Italy cannot claim a Japanese-type excuse 
and has, contrary to Germany, lost competitiveness since the Euro came into being.  
More importantly, in the three areas singled out in this paper as having hindered 
performance relative to Germany and Japan, little progress is evident. Industrial relations have 
improved somewhat, but more because of the erosion of union power than because of any 
concerted effort to build a social consensus. The Mezzogiorno’s relative backwardness has 
hardly changed, thus frustrating any attempt at raising Italy’s potential growth rate. The present 
government’s incompetence has sunk to new depths. Given the virtual absence of reforms and a 
hopelessly divided political system, it is difficult to see how the country can, despite the 
continuing vitality of its SME sector, return to significantly higher growth rates.  
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Table 1. Italy, Germany, Japan: Growth of Per Capita GDP 
 
(average annual percentage changes) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  





Italy       8.5       5.1       2.3       0.5       3.4        
 
Germany     10.7       4.8       1.9       1.3       3.6   
 
Japan       8.0       8.0       2.5       0.7       4.3 
 
Rest of OECD area
b      2.7       2.9       1.8       1.7
       2.2   
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  . The data for 2011 come from Oxford Economics forecasts. 
b. The “Rest of the OECD area” (which excludes IGJ) is defined as Western Europe (excluding Turkey), North 
America (excluding Mexico), Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Sources: Baffigi (2011); The Conference Board Total Economy Database, January 2011; Maddison, 2003; 
Oxford Economics Data Base, July 2011. 
 




                                      Budget balance
a         Growth of broad        Consumer price 
                                        (in per cent of             money supply              inflation 
                                        nominal GDP)          (average annual percentage changes) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy                                      -2.5                            14.1                             3.8 
Germany                                1.9                            14.0                             2.7 
Japan                                      0.3                            18.5                             4.6 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Annual averages; the data are approximate as no consistent series for government net lending seems to be 
available for the whole period for any of the three countries. 
 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (1980 Yearbook) and Data Base; OECD, National Accounts of 








                                 Population aged 15-64                       Population aged 25 and over 
                    (equivalent years of primary education)     (average years of total schooling) 
                            1950               1973                        1950         1970        
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy    5.5      7.6    4.1       5.2  
Germany  10.4      11.6    4.9      5.2 
Japan    9.1      12.1    6.1      7.5 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Barro and Lee, 2010; Maddison, 1995. 
28Table 4. Italy, Germany, Japan: Export Performance in the “Golden Age” 
 
(average annual percentage changes) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                       A. Price and Quantity Shifts, 1953-73 
                                       Export volume                      Export unit values 
                                            growth                    Relative to         Relative to domestic 
  competitors            wholesale prices 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy                                   13.1                    -1.2                      -1.2 
Germany                           10.7                     1.2   2.1 
Japan                                  17.2                         -1.5         -0.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                     B. Growth of Manufactured Exports and Markets
a, 1955-71                     
                                       Export market          Export volume             Gain or loss 
                                            growth                      growth                in market shares 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy 9.1  15.2
b    6.1 
Germany  9.9  10.3    0.5 
Japan 7.1  17.7  10.5 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. In volume terms. Market growth was given by the growth of manufactured exports of 12 major OECD economies 
in six commodity groups to eight geographical areas.   
b. Italy’s data, not shown separately in the original source, were derived from OEEC/OECD foreign trade statistics 
and deflated by unit values that were roughly estimated using available (incomplete and imperfect) Italian data. 
 
Sources: Annuario statistico italiano; Batchelor et al., 1980; IMF, International Financial Statistics (1980 and 1990 
Yearbooks); OEEC, Statistical Bulletins, Foreign Trade, Series IV; OECD, Trade by Commodities, Series 
C. 
 
29Table 5. Italy, Germany, Japan: Responses to the Oil Shocks 
 




                                                     Average earnings             Consumer price inflation 
  1973-76 1978-81 1973-76   1978-81 
                                      _____________________________________________________ 
 
Italy  21.7  21.2  17.6  17.9        
Germany    7.9    5.5    5.6    5.2     
Japan  17.5    5.4  14.8    5.5 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 






Table 6. Italy, Germany, Japan: Financial Indicators, 1973-95 
 




       Budget   Consumer       Nominal        Real   Real short- 
       deficit
a            price      effective      effective      term interest
 
       inflation  exchange rate exchange rate      rate
b 
                        ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy         -9.8        10.8         -5.0        -0.5           2.7        
Germany         -2.8          3.4          3.3         2.0        2.9   
Japan         -2.2          4.2          5.2         2.9        2.9 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  . In per cent of nominal GDP. 
b. Short-term rate less change in GDP deflator. 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Data Base; OECD, Economic Outlook 
Data Base; Oxford Economics Data Base. 
30Table 7. Italy, Germany, Japan: Importance of Small Firms 
 




                            1961  1971  1981  1991  2001         
                     _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy            26.4
c          28.3         33.6  38.9  41.8 
Germany
a          18.3          17.4                 22.2  20.5
d 22.5 
Japan
b                43.7





ote: The data may not be strictly comparable across countries. 
a. The data are approximate since definitions changed in the period and East Germany is included from 1991. 
    A very rough attempt was made to try to make the data comparable.  
b. The             employment data exclude establishments with 1 to 3 workers (1 to 4 in 1981).   
c  . 11 to 100 employees. 
d   . 1990. 
e  
. 1959. 




























                                  Rule of  Employm.  Starting  Closing   Enforcng.         
                                        law
a   protect.
b a  busin.
c a  busin.
d    contrcts
e 
                     _______________________________________________________________ 
 
Italy    2003       1.05
f               2.7
g              16      39  1390 
   2009       0.39       1.4         6
h      58
h 1210
h 
Germany     2003         1.63
f               2.5
g               27       50    403 
   2009       1.63       2.1       12
h      53
h    394
h 
Japan   2003       1.36
f       2.0
g              21             93    242 
   2009       1.31       1.2       16
h      93
h    360
h 
Rest of   2003       1.59
f       1.0
g       12      71    309 
OECD area  2009       1.56       0.9         8
h      78
h    366
h 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
   
N
 
ote: The data may not be strictly comparable across countries. 
a  . Deviations from world average. 
b. Strictness of employment legislation. OECD index updated with World Bank summary measure of labour market 
rigidities.   
c  . Average of number of procedures and time spent (in days) to register a new firm. 
d   . Claimants’ recovery rate (in percentage) from an insolvent firm. 
e  . Duration of legal procedures (in days) needed to resolve disputes. 
f  . 1996. 




Sources: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2004; World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators” and “Doing 
















                                  Italy   Germany       Japan 





1960    24.7       34.7           32.3 
1970    37.0       32.0           35.1 
1980    49.6       34.9                     31.1 
1990    38.8       31.2           25.4 
2000    34.8       24.6           21.5 
2010    35.1       18.6           18.4 
 
Strike Activity
b        
 
1950-59      679          98            715 
1960-69
c   1402          22            250 
1970-79    1503          53            124 
1980-89      621          27              10 
1990-99      158          11                2 
2000-08           92
d            5                0 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  . Union members in per cent of total employees. 
b   . Working days lost per thousand employees. 




Sources:  Bean, 1989; Economic and Labour Market Review and Employment Gazette (various issues); Flora et al. 
1987;  ILO, Statistical Database; Labour Market Trends and Monthly  Labor Review (various issues); 
OECD Data Base.  
                               
 
 
33Fig. 1   
Convergence: 1953-1973
Ch.Yi  = (logY i 1973  - logY i 1953) % p.a.  

























Ch.Y  i = 27.7 - 2.76 log (Y  i  )  1953 
    (8.2) 
R 




















Extent of economic liberalisation (Thousands)
Country's GDP per capita in 1953 (Y  i  1953 ) in 1990 ppp dollars (thsnds.) 












Share in world exports of manufactures 
 (3 years moving averages)
1950


























Indicator of government interference
with the economy










Source:  Gwartney and Lawson (2009).
Note : values go from 0 to 10; higher values denote greater economic freedom
 
 
36           
         
        
           
4.0
Source:: IMF,    Direction of Trade Statistics.
Fig. 4 
 
TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND CHINA 
ITALY - TRADE WITH 
EASTERN EUROPE 
(percentage shares in total
exports plus imports) 
GERMANY - TRADE WITH
EASTERN EUROPE
(percentage shares in total 
exports plus imports)
JAPAN - TRADE WITH 
CHINA 


























(in per cent of GDP)













(total household assets in per cent 
of disposable income)









Source: OECD,  Economic Outlook (various issues).
Other countries*







Source: UNPD, World Population Prospects (2010 Revision) Data Bank.
        
         
     
       
4.0
THE AGEING POPULATION POPULATION LEVELS
(1990 = 100)  (share of people aged 65 an  more  d
























1995 2000 2005 201
Japan
0 5 : UNPD, World Population Prospects (2010 Revision) Data Bank.
201 1990 1995 200
0
2015
Source Source : UNPD, World Population Prospects (2010 Revision) Data Bank.
39 
       
Fig. 8 
 
 REGIONAL INCOME DIFFERENTIALS
B. "Poor" region's GDP per 
capita in % of "rich" region
     
    
      
4.0 
 















1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005




     Japan
(11 regions)
West Germany 






A. Weighted coefficient of
   variation for per capita
         regional GDP
Sources: Italian, German and Japanese National Accounts.
40References 
 
Abelshauser, W. (2004), Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, München: C.H.Beck. 
Abramovitz, M. (1986), “Catching up, Forging ahead, and Falling behind”, Journal of Economic History, 
46, 2, pp. 385-406. 
Ackley, G. and Ishi, H. (1976), “Fiscal, Monetary, and Related Policies”,  in Patrick, H. and Rosovsky, 
H. (eds.), Asia’s New Giant, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Arcelli, M. (ed.) (1997), Storia, economia e società in Italia, 1947-1977, Bari: Laterza. 
Arcelli, M and Micossi, S. (1997), “La politica economica negli anni Ottanta (e nei primi anni 
Novanta)”, in Arcelli, M. (ed.). 
Armstrong, P., Glyn, A. and Harrison, J. (1991), Capitalism since 1945, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Baffigi, A. (2011), Italy’s Historical National Accounts, 1861-2011, Banca d’Italia – Quaderni di Storia 
Economica, October, forthcoming. 
Barba Navaretti, G., Bugamelli, M., Ottaviano, G. and Schivardi, F. (2010), “The Global Operations of 
European Firms”, Bruegel Policy Brief, 5, June. 
Barca, F. (ed.) (1997), Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra a oggi, Roma: Donzelli editore. 
Barca, F. (1997), “Compromesso senza riforme nel capitalismo italiano”, in Barca, F. (ed.).  
Barca, F. and Trento, S. (1997), “La parabola delle partecipazioni statali: una missione tradita”, in Barca, 
F. (ed.). 
Barca, F., Iwai, K., Pagano, U. and Trento, S. (2001), “Divergence in Corporate Governance Models: 
The Role of Institutional Shocks”, in Boltho, A., Vercelli, A. and Yoshikawa, H. (eds.). 
Barro, R.J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995), Economic Growth, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.  
Barro, R.J. and Lee, J.-W. (2010), A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World 1950-2010, 
NBER Working Paper, no. 15902, April. 
Basevi, G. and Onofri, P. (1997), “Uno sguardo retrospettivo alla politica economica italiana negli anni 
Settanta”, in Arcelli, M. (ed.). 
Batchelor, R.A., Major, R.L. and Morgan, A.D. (1980), Industrialisation and the Basis for Trade, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bean, R. (ed.) (1989), International Labour Statistics, London: Routledge. 
Blanchflower, D.G. and Oswald, A.J. (1992), International Wage Curves, NBER Working Paper, no. 
4200, October. 
Boltho, A. (1986), “L’economia italiana a confronto: 1973-1985”, in Ente Einaudi, Oltre la crisi, 
Bologna: Il Mulino. 
————— (1996a), “Was Japanese Growth Export-led ?”, Oxford Economic Papers, 48, 3, July, pp. 
415-432. 
41————— (1996b), “Convergence, Competitiveness and the Exchange Rate”, in Crafts, N. and 
Toniolo, G. (eds.). 
————— (2001a), “Reconstruction after Two World Wars: Why the Differences ?”, Journal of 
European Economic History, 30, 2, Fall, pp. 429-456. 
————— (2001b), “Foreign Trade Performance: Frome Early Similarities to Present Diversity”, in 
Boltho, A., Vercelli, A. and Yoshikawa, H. (eds.). 
————— (2010), “Why Do Some Regional Differentials Persist and Others Do Not ? Italy and Spain 
Compared, 1950-2000”, Rivista di storia economica, 26, 1, April, pp. 3-33. 
Boltho, A., Vercelli, A. and Yoshikawa, H. (eds.) (2001), Comparing Economic Systems: Italy and 
Japan, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Calmfors, L. and Driffill, J. (1988), “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism, and Macroeconomic 
Performance”, Economic Policy, 6, April, pp. 12-61. 
Carlin, W. (1996), “West German Growth and Institutions, 1945-90”, in Crafts, N. and Toniolo, G. 
(eds.). 
————— (2010), Good Institutions are not Enough: Ongoing Challenges of East German 
Development, CESifo Working Paper Series, no. 3204, October. 
Castronovo, O. (1995), Storia economica d’Italia: Dall’Ottocento ai giorni nostri, Torino: Einaudi. 
Causa, O., Dantan, S. and Johansson, Å. (2009), Intergenerational Social Mobility in European OECD 
Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 709. 
Caves, R.E. (1971), “Export-led Growth and the New Economic History”, in Bhagwati, J.N., Jones, 
R.W., Mundell, R.A. and Vanek, J. (eds.), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, Amsterdam: 
North Holland. 
Ciocca, P. (2007), Ricchi per sempre ?, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Ciocca, P., Filosa, R. and Rey, G.M. (1973), “Integrazione e sviluppo dell’economia italiana nell’ultimo 
ventennio: un rieasame critico”, in Banca d’Italia, Contributi alla ricerca economica, vol.III, 
Roma. 
Crafts, N. and Toniolo, G. (eds.) (1996), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
D’Addio, A.C. (2007), Intergenerational Transmission of Disadvantage: Mobility or Immobility Across 
Generations?, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, no. 52. 
Da Empoli, D. (1993), “Public Choice in Italy”, Public Choice, 77, 1, pp. 75-83. 
de Cecco, M. (1971), “Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana e la sua collocazione internazionale”, Rivista 
internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali, 10, pp. 973-988. 
de Cecco, M. and Giavazzi, F. (1993), “Inflation and Stabilization in Italy: 1946-1951”, in Dornbusch, 
R., Nölling, W. and Layard, R. (eds.), Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East 
Today, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Egebo, T. and Englander, A.S. (1992), “Institutional Commitments and Policy Credibility: A Critical 
Survey and Empirical Evidence from the ERM”, OECD Economic Studies, 18, Spring, pp. 45-84. 
42Eichengreen, B. (2007), The European Economy since 1945, Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press. 
Flora, P., Kraus, F.and Pfenning, W. (1987), State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975, 
Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 
Gallaway, L.E., Rydén, R. and Vedder, R.K. (1975), “Internal Labor Migration in Sweden, 1967”, 
Swedish Journal of Economics, 75, 3, September, pp. 257-265. 
Giavazzi, F. and Spaventa, L. (1989), “Italy: The Real Effects of Inflation and Disinflation”, Economic 
Policy, 8, April, pp. 133-171. 
Giersch, H., Paqué, K.H. and Schmieding, H. (1992), The Fading Miracle, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Graziani, A. (1972) (ed.), L’economia italiana dal 1945 a oggi, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
————— (1998), Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Gros-Pietro, G.M. (1990), “La ristrutturazione dei grandi gruppi industriali”, Rivista di politica 
economica, 80, 5, pp. 149-169. 
Gwartney, J. and Lawson, R. (2009), Economic Freedom of the World, Vancouver: Economic Freedom 
Network. 
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001), “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism”, in Hall, P.A. and 
Soskice, D. (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heckelman, J.C. (2007), “Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years”, 
Southern Journal of Economics, 74, 1, July, pp. 18-33. 
Hennings, K.H. (1982), “West Germany”, in Boltho, A. (ed.) (1982), The European Economy: Growth 
and Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Houthakker, H.S. and Magee, S.P. (1969), “Income and Price Elasticities in World Trade”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 51, 2, May, pp. 111-125. 
Howell, D.R., Baker, D. Glyn, A. and Schmitt, J. (2007), “Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at 
the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence”, Capitalism and Society, 2, 1, pp. 
1-73. 
Kawagoe, T. (1993), “Land Reform in Postwar Japan”, in Teranishi, J. and Kosai, Y. (eds.). 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1967), Europe’s Postwar Growth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997), “Does Social Capital Have and Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 4, November, pp. 1251-1288. 
Kosai, Y. (1986), The Era of High-Speed Growth, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 
Krugman, P. (1984), “Import Protection as Export Promotion: International Competition in the Presence 
of Oligopolies and Economies of Scale”, in Kierzkowski, H. (ed.), Monopolistic Competition and 
International Trade, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
————— (1989), “Differences in Income Elasticities and Trends in Real Exchange Rates”, European 
Economic Review, 33, 5, May, pp. 1031-1046. 
Maddison, A. (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Paris: OECD. 
43————— (2003), The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris: OECD. 
Magnani, M. (1997), “Alla ricerca di regole nelle relazioni industriali: breve storia di due fallimenti”, in 
Barca, F. (ed.). 
Maier, C.S. (1999), “Conti e racconti: interpretazioni della performance dell’economia italiana dal 
dopoguerra a oggi”, in Ciocca, P. and Toniolo, G. (eds.), Storia economica d’Italia, I, 
Interpretazioni, Bari: Laterza. 
Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 3, pp. 681-712. 
Michalski, W. (1970), Export und Wirtschaftswachstum, Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv. 
Nakamura, T. (1981), The Postwar Japanese Economy, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 
National Institute (1963), “Fast and Slow-Growing Products in World Trade”, National Institute 
Economic Review, 25, August, pp. 22-39. 
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L. and Ochel, W. (2005), “Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What Do 
We Know ?”, Economic Journal, 115, 1, January, pp. 1-27. 
Nijkamp, P. and Poot, J. (2005), “The Last Word on the Wage Curve ?”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
9, 3, July, pp. 421-450. 
OECD (1989), Economies in Transition: Structural Adjustment in OECD Countries, Paris: OECD. 
Ohkawa, K. and Shinohara, M. (eds.) (1979), Patterns of Japanese Economic Development: A 
Quantitative Appraisal, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Panic, M. and Rajan, A.H. (1971), Product Changes in Industrial Countries’ Trade: 1955-1968, London: 
National Economic Development Office. 
Paqué, K.H. (1996), “Why the 1950s and not the 1920s ? Olsonian and non-Olsonian Interpretations of 
Two Decades of German Economic History”, in Crafts, N. and Toniolo, G. (eds.). 
Prodi, R. and De Giovanni, D. (1990), “Quarantacinque anni di politica industriale in Italia: protagonisti, 
obiettivi e strumenti”, Rivista di politica economica, 80, 5, pp. 35-62. 
Rossi, N. and Toniolo, G. (1996), “Italy”, in Crafts, N. and Toniolo, G. (eds.). 
Salvati, M. (1984), Economia e politica in Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi, Milano: Garzanti. 
————— (2000), Occasioni mancate, Bari: Laterza. 
————— (2011), Le origini lontane del ristagno economico presente, mimeo. 
Salvatore, D. (1977), “An Econometric Analysis of Internal Migration in Italy”, Journal of Regional 
Science, 17, 3, January, pp. 395-408. 
Signorini, F. L. and Visco, I. (1997), L’economia italiana, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Soskice, D. (1990), “Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized 
Countries”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6, 4, Winter, pp. 36-61. 
Stern, R.M. (1967), Foreign Trade and Economic Growth in Italy, New York, NY: Frederick A. Prager. 
44 
Teranishi, J. and Kosai, Y. (1993), “Introduction: Economic Reform and Stabilization in Postwar Japan”, 
in Teranishi, J. and Kosai, Y. (eds.). 
Teranishi, J. and Kosai, Y. (eds.) (1993), The Japanese Experience of Economic Reforms, New York, 
NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Tsuru, S. (1976), The Mainsprings of Japanese Growth: A Turning Point ?, Paris: The Atlantic Institute. 
Valli, V. (1977), L’economia e la politica economica italiana (1945-1979), Milano: Etas Libri. 
von Prollius, M. (2006), Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte nach 1945, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht. 
World Economic Forum (various years), Global Competitiveness Report, 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-
201 (http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness). 
Yamamura, K. (1982), “Success that Soured: Administrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan”, in 
Yamamura, K. (ed.), Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy, Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press. 





PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED “QUADERNI” (*)
N.		 1	 –	 Luigi Einaudi: Teoria economica e legislazione sociale nel testo delle Lezioni,	by	
Alberto	Baffigi	(September	2009).
N.		 2	 –	 European Acquisitions in the United States: Re-examining Olivetti-Underwood 
Fifty Years Later,	by	Federico	Barbiellini	Amidei,	Andrea	Goldstein	and	Marcella	
Spadoni	(March	2010).
N.		 3	 –	 La politica dei poli di sviluppo nel Mezzogiorno. Elementi per una prospettiva 
storica,	by	Elio	Cerrito	(June	2010).
N.		 4	 –	 Through the Magnifying Glass: Provincial Aspects of Industrial Grouth in Post-
Unification Italy,	by	Carlo	Ciccarelli	and	Stefano	Fenoaltea	(July	2010).
N.	 5	 –	 Economic Theory and Banking Regulation: The Italian Case (1861-1930s),	by	
Alfredo	Gigliobianco	and	Claire	Giordano	(November	2010).
N.	 6	 –	 A Comparative Perspective on Italy’s Human Capital Accumulation,	by	Giuseppe	
Bertola	and	Paolo	Sestito	(October	2011).
N.	 7	 –	 Innovation and Foreign Technology in Italy, 1861-2011,	by	Federico	Barbiellini	
Amidei,	John	Cantwell	and	Anna	Spadavecchia	(October	2011).
N.	 8	 –	 Outward and Inward Migrations in Italy: A Historical Perspective,	by	Matteo	
Gomellini	and	Cormac	Ó	Gráda	(October	2011).
N.	 9	 –	 Comparative Advantages in Italy: A Long-run Perspective,	by	Giovanni	Federico	
and	Nikolaus	Wolf	(October	2011).
N.	 10	 –	 Real Exchange Rates, Trade, and Growth: Italy 1861-2011,	by	Virginia	Di	Nino,	
Barry	Eichengreen	and	Massimo	Sbracia	(October	2011).
N.	 11	 –	 Public Debt and Economic Growth in Italy,	by	Fabrizio	Balassone,	Maura	Francese	
and	Angelo	Pace	(October	2011).
N.	 12	 –	 Internal Geography and External Trade:  Regional Disparities in Italy, 1861-2011,	
by	Brian	A’Hearn		and	Anthony	J.	Venables	(October	2011).
N.	 13	 –	 Italian  Firms  in  History:  Size,  Technology  and  Entrepreneurship,	 by	 Franco	
Amatori,	Matteo	Bugamelli	and	Andrea	Colli	(October	2011).
N.	 14	 –	 Italy, Germany, Japan: From Economic Miracles to Virtual Stagnation,	by	Andrea	
Boltho	(October	2011).
N.	 15	 –	 Old and New Italian Multinational Firms,	by	Giuseppe	Berta	and	Fabrizio	Onida	
(October	2011).
N.	 16	 –	 Italy and the First Age of Globalization, 1861-1940,	by	Harold	James	and	Kevin	
O’Rourke	(October	2011).
N.	 17	 –	 The Golden Age and the Second Globalization in Italy,	by	Nicholas	Crafts	and	
Marco	Magnani	(October	2011).
N.	 18	 –	 Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011,	by	Alberto	Baffigi	(October	2011).
N.	 19	 –	 The  Well-Being  of  Italians:  A  Comparative  Historical  Approach,	 by	 Andrea	
Brandolini	and	Giovanni	Vecchi	(October	2011).
N.	 20	 –	 A Sectoral Analysis of Italy’s Development, 1861-2011,	by	Stephen	Broadberry,	
Claire	Giordano	and	Francesco	Zollino	(October	2011).
N.	 21	 –	 The Italian Economy Seen from Abroad over 150 Years,	by	Marcello	de	Cecco	
(October	2011).
N.	 22	 –	 Convergence among Italian Regions, 1861-2011,	by	Giovanni	Iuzzolino,	Guido	
Pellegrini	and	Gianfranco	Viesti	(October	2011).
N.	 23	 –	 Democratization and Civic Capital in Italy,	by	Luigi	Guiso	and	Paolo	Pinotti	
(October	2011).
N.	 24	 –	 The  Italian  Administrative  System  since  1861,	 by	 Magda	 Bianco	 and	 Giulio	
Napolitano	(October	2011).
N.	 25	 –	 The Allocative Efficiency of the Italian Banking System, 1936-2011,	by	Stefano	
Battilossi,	Alfredo	Gigliobianco	and	Giuseppe	Marinelli	(October	2011).Printed by the  
Printing and Publishing Division  
of the Bank of Italy